President of Ukraine has already lost

Poroshenko’s general offensive ended in a deafening failure

Part 1.


The history teacher told everyone that there is a difference between formal reason and the real cause. This was told in school. As well as the fact that when the last is present, the formal reason is sure to happen, columnist of the Ukrainian weekly “2000” writes Sergey Burlachenko.

Indeed, the successful Casus belli (reason) allows, firstly, to mobilize patriotic sentiments in their own country, as well as to provide a more favorable international background: the allies will rather support, the neutrals will not be inclined to support the object of attack, and for allies, the successful Casus belli (turning the actual victim of aggression in her culprit) can be an excellent reason to avoid fulfilling its obligations.

However, not only, actually, in the matter of the beginning of the war, but also in many other things, more or less close to politics, a good or not reason may be the key to success or failure of the whole event. Ideally, the reason should be such that it was extremely difficult to distinguish it from its cause.

About the “fight” that was guaranteed.

More than a year ago, as soon as the bill on the “reintegration of Donbass” was submitted, it became clear that it could become the basis for canceling the elections according to the following scenario. Appeals to the Constitutional Court appear: does the fact of Russian aggression established by this law oblige the president to impose martial law for the period until the aggression ceases (i.e., to the statement of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine of the withdrawal of Russian troops) provided by this law.

The affirmative answer of the Constitutional Court in this case does not require casuistry, since the legislation of Ukraine is spelled out in such a way that the concept of “aggression” is analogous to the concept of “war”. In addition, there are judges in the Constitutional Court who believe that the martial law in the country exists de facto, and on this basis they do not support drafts of constitutional amendments: the Constitution prohibits its change in martial law.

It also prohibits the conduct of elections in Rada (Parliament) in such conditions. As for the presidential and local elections, the Constitution is silent, but the provision on their prohibition exists in the Law of Ukraine “On the legal regime of martial law” from the moment it appeared.

Any authorized subject may apply to the Constitutional Court: the president, a group of people’s deputies, the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. However, the latter does not exist, and for the president here it is not politically technological to take the initiative, but to prove how to do with it.

But in recent weeks it began to seem that such a scenario, meaning the cancellation of all elections for an indefinite period, is a purely abstract possibility. After all, if it were implemented, then the aforementioned appeal would certainly have been received by the Court, because this body is working slowly. Well, it is better to disrupt the elections until the moment the election process is already running.

But since such an appeal did not appear, it was possible to assume that either the West convincingly asked Poroshenko to avoid disrupting the elections, or the president was not sure about a positive verdict (for example, due to fear of judges to tarnish his reputation with a political decision to balance political reform under Yanukovich). Finally, it is theoretically possible to assume that no one has guessed playing a similar card. However, it is difficult to believe in this: politicians understand their own interests well. But to initiate martial law is not necessarily an interpretation of the law on the reintegration of Donbass. It is enough to exacerbate the situation that would be the reason for such a decision. This aggravation occurred on November 25th.

The essence of the conflict is that three Ukrainian warships (two armored boats and a tugboat) were sent from Odessa to Berdyansk to reinforce the Ukrainian naval forces in the Sea of ​​Azov. It is impossible to make this way, bypassing the Kerch Strait, and on September 22 two Ukrainian ships passed along this route in accordance with the right of peaceful passage recognized by international and Russian legislation, as well as the agreement between Ukraine and Russia on the use of the Sea of Azov.

But in any case, there are navigation restrictions on shipping in the Kerch Strait, especially under the arches of the bridge, requiring advance notification of the dispatch service and obtaining permission from the passage, taking on board the pilot (and paying for his services) and waiting its turn that may take up to two days.

As usual, the versions of the parties regarding these points diverge dramatically:

Ukrainian claims that all the necessary requests were made (but once again I will clarify that the passage through the strait is of a permissive, not a notification nature).

The Russian side reports that it informed Ukraine in advance about the closure of the water area. According to the Russian version (it appeared on the FSB website on the evening of November 26), shortly before the Ukrainian ships approached the strait on November 25 at 22.23 (Moscow time), the Russian border boat informed the Ukrainians “about the closure of the territorial sea of ​​the Russian Federation on the approach to the Kerch Strait from Black Sea.

There was a high probability that Russia, even with perfect observance of the procedure, would not miss Ukrainian warships under the bridge. The attempt to break through is hopeless and fraught with the most serious consequences. In addition, the 300-400-mile crossing of two river boats and a port tug with passport seaworthiness three points through an open, very troubled sea in November is a very risky undertaking, while ships are completely subject to transfer by rail.

Why and against whom it is necessary to strengthen the defense in the Black and Azov Seas

In general, remember how the brave soldier Schweik assigns his hot friend Sapper Vodichka a meeting at the Cafe At the Bowl after the war? To the question of the latter: “Will there be a fight there?” He replied: “Well, if we come, then there will definitely be!” And returning from the world classics, we recognize that the “fight” was guaranteed.

So, according to the Russian version, the Ukrainian ships entered the territorial waters of the Russian Federation (in the 12-mile zone from the coast), after which the Russians declared them to violate the border and began to impede their further advancement. At the same time, the Russian representative to the UN claims that the Ukrainian boats were in the waters that until 2014 were Russian. However, the delimitation of maritime borders between Ukraine and Russia in the Black Sea has never happened. And even in the FSB version, there is no mention of the violation of the Russian border for 2014. However, independent verification of these coordinates shows that when Russian ships began to interfere with Ukrainian, they were about 12 km from the entrance to the strait – at the same distance from the Crimean and Taman shores.

According to the Ukrainian version: the closure of the territorial waters of the Ukrainian sailors reported a few hours after the collision. However, the Navy Facebook page reported that the ships continue to carry out the mission. At the same time, the FSB Border Service announced that at 11.30 two Ukrainian armored boats moved from Berdyansk, which “follow the direction of the Kerch Strait to the area of ​​provocation organized by the Ukrainian side at top speed”. Ukraine has not refuted this information.

Then, referring to the FSB, TASS reported that these ships had turned back. But this information appeared only at 21.30, although, undoubtedly, the turn took place much earlier: if they moved to the strait, by that time they would have reached it long ago, but there was no information about their approach to this place.

I must say that when in September the Ukrainian ships passed the Kerch Strait, they were met by the same two armored boats. It can be assumed that the same plan took place, and the boats received an order in advance to advance to the estimated time of passage of the strait by three Ukrainian ships from the Black Sea. But this order was not canceled in a timely manner, and such a nomination objectively became a game of nerves for Russia (therefore, information about the turn of the armored boats was delayed in Moscow).

As for the Ukrainian ships on the other side of the strait, then, according to the Ukrainian version, they just stood at anchor and then moved back. According to the Russian – they were blocked for 8 hours, and under cover of darkness they tried to leave, while the Russians wanted to stop them, seeing them as trespassers, and after warning they used fire to kill.

As soon as it became known about the seizure of all three ships and the sailors on them, among whom there were wounded, the president gathered the National Security Council, after which he signed a decree on martial law for a period of two months.

About the rites that are forced to comply.

The power of a super-operational declaration of martial law once again demonstrated its “super task” in the current situation, since the declared terms of martial law (War time) meant at least a postponement of the presidential election, because by law they must be appointed by the Verkhovna Rada 100 days before them, and the election process begins in 90 days.

However, the concept of “election” means not only voting, but also the entire election procedure, including their announcement. Consequently, the rule of not conducting them during martial law also applies to the appointment of their date.

And the first question that has arisen for many, was reduced to whether Poroshenko could go on this combination without coordination with Western partners?