And the first question that has arisen for many, was reduced to whether Poroshenko could go on this combination without coordination with Western partners?
My answer – definitely could. Four and a half years of his time in the presidency clearly showed that he was ready to defend his interests in relations with the West not so hard, but very, very resourceful.
Obviously, they counted in Kiev that it would be the same this time, that in the western capitals they would simply be forced to accept the Kiev version of events, and hence the “reaction” in the form of the introduction of martial law. But, again, the meaning of what was happening was absolutely clear. According to our information, Kiev seriously hoped that “there” simply would not “slip through” the conflict with the elections, and then it would be too late to change position. They also hoped for the “Sunday factor”, in the expectation that in the evening of the day off only duty clerks on the spot would be in place in the relevant structures, who did not particularly know all the nuances of the “Ukrainian perspective.”
The miscalculation was that two points were not taken into account. Firstly, with political expediency in the West, certain “violations of the democratic procedure may“ was not noticed ”, but “rituals must be observed”, and the “cancellation” cannot be canceled, even more so given the sacral attitude there (albeit in words ) to democratic institutions. Secondly, in all Western capitals they expect that after March 31 a new owner will appear on Kiev, and such a “trick” from the current one there could not but cause a sharp aversion.
However, no less important is the question whether Poroshenko did create the situation intentionally or only took advantage of it? In my opinion, the second version looks more convincing. Indeed, in Kiev, they could not have foreseen in advance neither that Russia would close the corresponding water area, nor to what power actions it would resort to. But I admit that a list of situations that allow for a response in the form of martial law could have been determined in advance. Objectively, such a definition is necessary as part of a general strategy (even without taking into account the benefit Poroshenko received from this position).
The introduction of martial law for 60 days at a minimum would mean that it will expire during the winter parliamentary recess, and the Rada will not be able to approve the election date until February 1. T. o. they would have been appointed no earlier than May 13th. But this would be the most favorable scenario for the election. After all, martial law can be extended by the same procedure by which it is introduced. And the success of the first step would show how far you can go.
If the decree on martial law were easily approved by the Rada in the form originally proposed, then in such an atmosphere, the scenario of perpetuating martial law through the CC would also become more likely. An appetite would come to the presidential team while eating. And the farther – the more interested would be in the abolition of parliamentary elections, those who do not shine on them.
In theory, the president had every reason to hope for a smooth statement of the decree. The previous parliamentary week showed that the traditional parliamentary majority is able to carry out all the necessary decisions Poroshenko. Of course, it was possible to recall that the government did not introduce martial law even in more dramatic moments, and also to ask a reasonable question about how it would affect the military situation (as a result, such words were voiced).
But at first it seemed that everything would go according to the Poroshenko scenario, because the initial criticism of the deputies from the “Self-Help” presidential decree was besieged by their leader Andrei Sadovy. And presidential candidate Anatoly Gritsenko immediately after the meeting of the NSDC supported martial law on Facebook. I think the reason for this position was not only in their personal views and fear of being considered non-patriotic, but also in the fact that they considered the assertion of martial law to be inevitable and did not dare to oppose this inevitability.
The threat of turning the decree into full zilch became very obvious after the president did not support the NF, demanding a reduction in the term of the EaP, the limitation of its territories and the guarantees of presidential elections. Many politicians began to say that it is necessary to hold elections on time. I think that the respective appeal of the three presidents – Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yushchenko, which was distributed in Rada by Kravchuk, also played a role. It was said that now the military situation is mainly due to political motives. And if we introduce it, so that it does not interfere with the fact of the elections and would not contribute to the infringement of rights and freedoms.
About the big war that no one is waiting.
True, there is a legal nuance. Yes, the Rada voted in favor of this decision even before the law on the presidential decree on martial law was signed and promulgated. And according to the law “On the legal regime of martial law” such a decree comes into force only after such parliamentary ratification. However, in the decree itself martial law is counted from 14 hours on November 26. Consequently, the elections are appointed by the Rada already during martial law. In theory, this gives grounds for protesting the ruling in the Constitutional Court. But almost such a scenario – after what happened in the Rada – looks unlikely.
Of course, any authority would not mind limiting the rights of citizens, especially in difficult moments for themselves, but after the main point ’(about the period of validity) had to make cardinal concessions, the martial law became completely formal and completely incomprehensible: why in general It took what, in fact, the consequences it bears?
– Martial law is the restriction of the rights and freedoms of citizens, – Alexander Turchinov had to explain from the rostrum of the Rada.
It is not clear how far the restrictive measures mentioned above will be applied in practice, nor how, thanks to the EaP, Ukraine will be able to improve its position in the current conflict within a month. After all, its aggravation is related to the situation on the Black and Azov Seas, where Ukraine objectively cannot change the balance of forces.
I think the absolute majority of politicians understand that Ukraine is not facing a big war now. And, probably, in a month, the president will be able to assert that thanks to the martial regime, Ukraine has increased its combat readiness. However, for him personally, the operation with the introduction of the martial regime looks now unsuccessful.
Yes, the deputies gave him a retreat, retaining the face (although they accompanied the discussion of Poroshenko’s initiative with obscenities that caused even the president’s protest), and did not drive him into a corner, risking themselves to seem unpatriotic. But the situation revealed a picture of Poroshenko’s support in the Rada.
And, it seems, the party of Yatsenyuk behaved like this, because its deputies agreed with Poroshenko’s competitors about their own political survival. However, it was possible to guess the convention of support for the president before, but one thing is just a guess, another thing is a public demonstration of this convention, which becomes a factor working on the downgrade of the head of state’s rating.
So, as a result of the “consultation” that preceded the adoption of the final version, Poroshenko’s efforts to save face were reduced, and not to make the martial into complete profanation. However, he did not succeed much. Paragraph 3 of the decree, providing for the possibility of limiting the constitutional rights of citizens, was preserved.
In such a configuration, it is not necessary to look for certain “second meanings” such as the fact that these are mainly regions of the southeast, where Poroshenko received the smallest number of votes in the last election. The main thing that was actually required was the law should not affect Kiev (and also Lviv), the capital, where the main political life is conducted, where the vast majority of all-Ukrainian media are located. T. o. the martial regime in the final version may turn out to be a complete profanation, if not de jure, then de facto. Poroshenko did not achieve any of his political objectives.
About menacing drift.
Of course, it’s important to make it a matter of course. : why not the consequences of it bears?
It will not be clear how it would be in the country. After all, where Ukraine objectively cannot change balance of forces.
It’s not clear that there’s been a situation in which it’s been possible to make it out. Poroshenko’s support of the Rada. It’s not a problem. its rating.
And, it seems, the party has agreed to keep it up. However, it was possible to make a decision on the convention.
If you’re trying to save your final final version of the “final version”. However, he did not succeed much. It has been noted that the importantly, the action of the martial regime was limited to ten areas.
It is not necessary to make sure that these are mainly regions of the past, where they received the smallest number of votes. It is a rule that it’s not a matter of course. media are located. T. o. It can be a complete profanation, if not de jure, then de facto. Poroshenko did not achieve any of his political objectives.
New questions have been added to the already existing ones regarding the closest associate of President Yury Lutsenko. He did not participate in all the “movements” around the martial status, since he was on vacation in Japan. It is likely that this is a “political” vacation. And given the previous statements, there is every reason to believe that upon his return, Lutsenko will categorically demand his resignation.
In general, the general offensive undertaken by Poroshenko ended in a deafening failure. In an extremely dubious asset there is a completely useless martial law, while in the passive it is a clear loss of control over parliament, new very serious cracks in the coalition, the real collapse of one’s own team and economic problems.
And most importantly, against the background of all this, nobody believes in the “prospects” of Poroshenko, and will act in accordance with this understanding. So, the process of the collapse of the current government can take on the nature of the spiral unwinding. But here is another, the most troubling question: will new, even more dangerous, adventures follow? After all, there seems to be nothing to lose. Another thing is that the unpredictability of Kiev’s policies is increasingly annoying to the West, and this too can become a kind of deterrent factor.
It is already obvious that no less than the internal allies, Peter Poroshenko in the “Kerch case” upset and continue to upset his allies and senior partners in the West. True, it did not come to open criticism of Kiev this time, but the extreme restraint of the Western reaction is striking. Although the first statements by NATO and the EU contained on duty words about supporting the territorial integrity of Ukraine, its right to free navigation in the Sea of Azov and a call for Russia to release the captured ships and sailors, they did not condemn the latter, restraint . In a situation where one of the parties is a friend and ally, and the second is a “difficult partner” at best, this equalization indicates a lot.