There were expert allegations that Russian marine part of the nuclear triad in some situations is untenable.
The famous naval weapons expert Maxim Klimov, speaking in the LiveJournal under the nickname mina030, once again made a loud statement, which, in our opinion, could not but cause great excitement of the Russian public. He said that in the event of the outbreak of another world war, our latest ballistic missile submarine R-30 Bulava in some situations simply won’t be able to launch on time after the Supreme Commander issued an order to launch them from nuclear submarines located on combat routes patrols.
No, from the point of view of the author, perhaps the rockets will start. But – in two days. That is, when the nuclear phase of the war is likely to be already behind.
Yes, experts know that the Russian Navy has had certain problems with the Bulava from the very beginning of its existence. But to take and practically delete the R-30 from the list of deterrence weapons related to the nuclear triad of Russia – this is the first time we hear this.
While we are talking only about sniper rifles and ammunition.
The question is very serious, directly related not only to the country’s security, but also to the problem of guarantees for the existence of Russia in the foreseeable future. Therefore, you have to try to figure out how much Klimov owns top-secret information? And how does he interpret unclassified?
The expert began the conversation in connection with the end of the recent exercises of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Armed Forces “Thunder-2019”. No one then had any questions about how clearly the Long-Range Aviation, which was created primarily as an air component of the nuclear triad, worked out during the exercises. And also – our Strategic Missile Forces. But to the Russian Navy, unfortunately, today there are almost always questions. And Klimov was not the first to draw attention to the fact that the combat readiness review of the marine component of the nuclear triad was held with knots and with hitch.
Formerly “Newspaper. ru “said that the failure occurred on the strategic nuclear submarine missile carrier K-44” Ryazan “project 667BDR Kalmar. The ship was supposed to launch from the Barents Sea two ballistic missiles R-29R of the Chizh range (Arkhangelsk region). However, one of them could not be launched from Ryazan.
The Department of Defense immediately responded by refuting the malfunction during the most important shooting. The meaning of the refutation is that information about the missile launch program during the exercises is confidential. Therefore, all press reports on partial failure are speculation. Like, from the very beginning they planned to launch one missile with K-44. It was launched. Because the meaning of strategic exercises is not to verify the operation of weapons, but to control the development of the powerful structure of strategic combat control.
However, Klimov points to a clear emergency situation that the press service of the Ministry of Defense failed to camouflage. On October 14, in anticipation of the exercises, Acting Chief of the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense, Major General Evgeni Ilyin told RIA Novosti that 16 practical launches of cruise and ballistic missiles would be made. Including – “Clubs” and “Blue”. However, the launch of the Bulava did not take place.
– Something went wrong,- Klimov writes.
But, fortunately, this happens. That is – for the last time, the Bulava was launched in August 2019 from the nuclear submarine cruiser of the Borey project Yuri Dolgoruky (Northern Fleet). As always – from west to east, from the northern seas – along the Kamchatka training ground “Kura”. But in the “right” (from the point of view of most scenarios of the possible start of the Third World War direction (in the west) “Bulava” our submariners have never shot. Despite the fact that relatively recently, the Pacific Fleet received two new submarine missiles of the Borey type – Alexander Nevsky and Vladimir Monomakh.
Actually, these boats equipped with “Bulava” did not shoot from the Pacific Ocean in any other direction. In this connection, Klimov concludes: the boats were urgently sent to the Far East, where, despite assurances from the authorities, the Vilyuchinsky naval base in Kamchatka is not yet ready for their reception. Unfinished. Because they are supposedly from the Pacific and are not capable of launching missiles.
I must say that Klimov’s evidence system is based largely on the method of deduction.
It was this method that allowed the expert to continue the logical chain with the following statement: the transfer of these submarines from the North to the Pacific Fleet is directly related to the fact that such nuclear-powered submarines in the Arctic have extremely low combat readiness. The reason – the Bulava rocket is not able to start from under the ice. Namely, under the ice, our nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet usually carry combat service.
Why is the Bulava unable to start from under the ice? The reason, according to Klimov, is that the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering, which developed the missile, at one time was given the “wrong” tactical and technical requirements for it: “The task of designing its competitor, closed in the late 90s, is SLBM (ballistic missile for submarines ) “Bark” – provided for the possibility of passage when firing SLBMs through the ice. This requirement became critically necessary for the 4th generation RPMS, taking into account their streamlined shape and limited capabilities for breaking ice and the problems of removing its large fragments from the rocket deck. ”
– And in “Bulava” they forgot about this quality, – says Klimov. Therefore, the Boreas, being in the northern latitudes, are forced to search for a suitable wormwood for a long time to launch the Bulava. Such searches can take up to two days.
In general – frost on the skin. It is good that the author of this version does not call for saboteurs and pests. And roughly punish them. Because such a “miss” cannot but be the result of malicious intent, which the Navy High Command could not be aware of.
In fact, the Bulava at TTZ level was supposed to be a more budget-friendly SLBM option than the Bark. That is why they did not begin to demand the “impossible” from her. That is – giving the pioneer function, which previously did not have a single underwater missile. This is the first.
Secondly, the Bark project was not closed as a result of malicious intent. This rocket was created for almost a decade and a half. However, no practical result was obtained. Work turned off after three unsuccessful launches. At the same time, the function of breaking the ice when firing the Bark was not checked.
Thirdly, the statement about the limited possibility of breaking the ice by fourth-generation rocket carriers somehow does not sound very serious. Because the shape of the Boreev hull is streamlined. Therefore, it is really difficult to remove the ice from their deck, since those on it will not linger. And this despite the fact that the energy potential of the Borea is higher than that of the third-generation boats.
Using the same method of deduction. And, using the information operated by Klimov, we can offer another version. Two SSBNs were relocated to the Pacific Fleet not because the Borey was unable to break ice and launch missiles. And because from this region to the territory of our main strategic adversary, as they say, a stone’s throw. It should be borne in mind that the Bulava has a rather modest range. So such a regrouping of submarine missile carriers is both logical and rational.
As for the non-participation of the Bulava in the Thunder-2019 strategic exercises, then, of course, the Boreas of the Northern Fleet were not looking for ice. Some kind of emergency situation at the Ryazan nuclear-powered ship is quite likely.
And here is why the Pacific “Boreas” did not shoot during the “Thunder-2019”, there is also a deductive explanation for this. The previous generation (third) SSBNs fire from Kamchatka at the Chizh training ground with missiles or with monoblock warheads, or with a maximum of four divorcing warheads (an option to equip the Sineva missile). This is because this landfill has a limited area.
The minimum number of BBs at Bulava is six. In addition, the circular probable deviation (CVO), very significant for modern missiles, is 350 meters. That is, the probability of ammunition falling into a circle with a radius of 350 meters is 50%.
The Sineva KVO is 250 meters away. And this figure is proved by numerous tests. The real situation with the Bulava may well be worse than on paper. So it may very well be that the Bulava’s firing in the “right direction” – from east to west – is not carried out for security reasons.
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This rocket already has real problems, so as not to ascribe to them also a “two-day preparation for launch in search of wormwood”. First of all, its flight range is 9300 km. While the “Sineva” and the American “Trident” – for 11,000 km.
However, this is not so scary. The main problem is predetermined by two other weak characteristics of the “Mace” – its not the best CWO (which we have already said) and insignificant casting weight (1150 kg).
While the “Sineva” and “Trident-2” threw weight – 2800 kg each. This affects the ability of the rocket to deliver the first strike with the aim of destroying the strategically important enemy targets – command posts located in bunkers or other protected engineering structures. As well as the launch mines of ground ballistic missiles.
It has been established that in order to destroy protected targets on the territory of the enemy, it is necessary to create an excess pressure of about 30 atmospheres during the explosion of a warhead at the epicenter. And for specially protected mines – 50 atmospheres. It was also established that in order to destroy a rocket mine, it is necessary to detonate a charge with a capacity of 100 kilotons no further than at a distance of 100 meters from the target.
When using the Bulava and Trident-2 missiles, the alignment turns out to be strongly not in our favor. The probability of destruction by six warheads of 150 kt each with a KVO of 250 m of protected mines at Bulava is 0.1. Trident-2 (8 BBs at 475 ct each, KVO – 90-120 m) – 0.5. This sad relationship for us is capable of giving the United States the illusion of the possibility of delivering an unpunished nuclear strike on Russia.
Information periodically appears that the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering is working on a modification of the “Bulava” in order to increase the power and accuracy characteristics of the rocket. But when the results appear – it is not known. Therefore, for the time being, the Navy has to be blown away mainly by the RSVN, where Voevoda ICBMs are on constant alert, capable of crushing any bunkers and mines into gravel.
Well, in the foreseeable future, we should have an even more powerful Sarmat ICBM with Avangard hypersonic maneuvering warheads.